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ABSTRACT: In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s 
and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good ev-
idence for theories of reference.  
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RESUMEN: En este artículo defiendo que las intuiciones de los filósofos sobre la referencia no son más fiables que las 
de los legos  y que las intuciones sobre la referencia de los nombres propios y los usos de los nombres pro-
pios ofrecen evidencia de igual valor para las teorías de la referencia. 
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1. Introduction 
Michael Devitt’s (2012) thoughtful article “Whither experimental semantics?” re-
sponds to three articles I have authored or coauthored (Machery 2012; Machery and 
Stich 2012; Machery et al. forthcoming), and makes two novel contributions to the 
evolving debate about the epistemology of semantics1: A plea for the Expertise De-
fense and a sketch of what Devitt takes to be the proper method for confirming theo-
ries of reference. Focusing exclusively on these two novel contributions, I argue that 
philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s – if 
anything, they are probably worse – and that intuitions about the reference of proper 
names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of refer-
ence.2 In Section 2, I argue that it is unclear whether experts’ intuitions about refer-
ence are more reliable than, and thus preferable to, lay people’s. In fact, as I show in 
Section 3, they may even be less reliable and thus less preferable. Finally, I turn to the 
contribution of corpus and production studies to the confirmation of semantic theo-
ries. 
                                                     
1 I propose to call this area of inquiry “semantic epistemology” by analogy to “moral epistemology”: 
While the latter is concerned with the justification of moral judgments and moral theories, the former 
is concerned with the justification of semantic judgments and semantic theories.  
2 I will be assuming throughout that there is such a thing as reference (although, as Devitt notes, I have 
expressed doubts about this in Machery and Stich 2012), and that we can have better or worse theo-
ries about reference.  
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2. Should Experts’ Intuitions about Reference be Preferred?  
2.1 Two Unanswered Concerns 
The Expertise Defense is, roughly, the view that experimental findings about lay peo-
ple’s intuitions do not bear much (if at all) on philosophical controversies because lay 
people’s intuitions are less reliable than philosophers’ (Machery 2011). Devitt has en-
dorsed the Expertise Defense about semantic intuitions in his (2011) critique of Ma-
chery et al. (2004) and Mallon et al. (2009), and he has responded to some of my ob-
jections to this line of argument in his “Whither experimental semantics?”. Unfortu-
nately, Devitt’s response fails to address some of the concerns I raised. 
 On Devitt’s view, philosophers are likely to have better intuitions about reference 
than lay people because they have better theories. Unfortunately, Devitt does not ex-
plain in any detail how philosophers’ theories of reference enhance the reliability of 
their intuitions. This silence is a striking shortcoming considering that Devitt has re-
peatedly criticized proponents of the Voice of Competence for failing to explain how 
linguistic competence could be the source of people’s metalinguistic intuitions (e.g., 
Devitt 2012, 15-8).  
 Devitt cannot ignore this request for explanation since it is dubious that philoso-
phers’ theorizing about reference can really enhance the reliability of their intuitions 
about reference. First, the theories of reference developed by philosophers of lan-
guage disagree about almost everything, and one wonders what feature these theories 
have in common that could render the intuitions of philosophers of language more re-
liable than lay people’s. Similar concerns were expressed in Section 3.1 of Machery 
2012, but Devitt did not address them.  
 Second, even when scientists have better theories than lay people, their intuitions 
are not always improved by these theories, and it is unclear why Devitt thinks that in-
tuitions about reference would be any different. For instance, statisticians’ and psy-
chologists’ statistical theories do not influence, and thus do not improve, many of 
their statistical intuitions (even those about simple statistical issues such as the signifi-
cance of sample size). Kahneman writes (2011, 5): 
In spite of years of teaching and using statistics, we [Kahneman and Tversky] had not developed 
an intuitive sense of the reliability of statistical results observed in small samples. Our subjective 
judgments were biased: we were far too willing to believe research findings based on inadequate 
evidence and prone to collect too few observations in our own research. 
Thus, even if one grants that philosophers of language have better theories of refer-
ence than lay people, it does not follow that philosophers’ intuitions about reference 
are more reliable than lay people’s. Similar concerns were expressed in Section 3.2 of 
Machery 2012, but Devitt did not address them. 
 Perhaps Devitt did not address these concerns because he believes that philoso-
phers’ theories could fail to improve their intuitions only if the Voice of Competence 
were true, but this would be a mistake: Even if the Voice of Competence is false, phi-
losophers’ explicit theories need not influence their intuitions (Machery 2012, Section 
3.2). 
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 Some findings mentioned by Devitt in “Whither experimental semantics?” suggest 
in fact that, just like statistical intuitions, many linguistic intuitions are probably not in-
fluenced by linguists’ theories. While syntacticians and semanticists have undoubtedly 
better theories than lay people about many linguistic properties, their intuitions are of-
ten identical to lay people’s (Devitt 2012, 22). Consistent with Devitt’s views, this may 
be the case because the intuition-eliciting stimuli are so simple that even a minimum 
amount of expertise (the amount lay people possess) is sufficient to get them right 
(Devitt 2012, 23).3 Alternatively, lay people and linguists may have the same intuitions 
because often linguists’ theories do not influence their intuitions. This second explana-
tion is better since, contrary to what Devitt would predict, linguists and lay people of-
ten have the same intuitions even for difficult stimuli. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence about Experts’ Intuitions  
In “Expertise and intuitions about reference,” I reported some new empirical results: 
While philosophers of language and semanticists are more likely than lay people to 
have Kripkean intuitions about the reference of proper names in a Gödel-style case, 
sociolinguists, historical and anthropological linguists, and discourse analysts are less 
likely to have Kripkean intuitions than lay people. I tentatively took these findings to 
undermine the Expertise Defense because expertise cannot improve reliability if it 
makes some groups of experts more Kripkean and others more descriptivist. Devitt 
dismisses this conclusion on the grounds that sociolinguists, historical and anthropo-
logical linguists, and discourse analysts have no expertise about reference (2012, 24). 
 However, this response is inappropriate for the reasons already discussed in Ma-
chery (2012, 51-2): Sociolinguists as well as historical and anthropological linguists 
study reference as much as, if not more than, semanticists. Furthermore, Devitt’s re-
sponse is in tension with his claim about the role of corpus studies in the confirmation 
of theories of reference (2012, 27-8): In contrast to philosophers of language and to 
most semanticists who rarely, if ever, examine corpora, sociolinguists, historical and 
anthropological linguists, and discourse analysts often study corpora to understand the 
variation in, and stability of, reference. 
 To conclude, it is dubious that philosophical theorizing about reference really en-
hances the reliability of philosophers’ intuitions, and there is thus little reason to ac-
cept the Expertise Defense. 
3. Lay People’s Intuitions Should be Preferred 
In fact, some reasons even militate for preferring lay people’s intuitions about refer-
ence to philosophers’. Machery and Stich (2012) examined three reasons that are con-
vincing an increasing number of linguists to examine lay people’s linguistic intuitions 
experimentally instead of consulting the intuitions of a few linguists informally, as they 
used to. First, linguists’ intuitions may sometimes be biased by their own theoretical 
                                                     
3 Alternatively, the intuition-eliciting stimuli could be so complex that linguists’ better theories do not 
give them any advantage. 
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commitments; second, linguists may speak idiolects that differ from lay people’s; third, 
factorial analyses with large sample sizes are needed to understand how variables in-
teract to determine the grammaticality of syntactic constructions. These three reasons 
carry over to the intuitions of interest to philosophers of language. 
 Devitt has nothing to say about the third reason, and he is not impressed by the 
first one (2012, 21). Noting correctly that the influence of linguists’ theoretical com-
mitments on their intuitions is an instance of a more general problem – the possible 
influence of scientists’ theories on their judgments – Devitt seems to conclude that 
this possible influence does not justify preferring lay people’s intuitions to philoso-
phers’. This is the wrong conclusion, however. When scientists identify a possible bias, 
they do not simply mutter “C’est la vie!”, but they find ways to control for it, such as 
randomization, double-blind experiments, and independent coding of data. Similarly, 
to control for possible biases affecting their own intuitions, linguists have started ex-
amining lay people’s intuitions experimentally. Philosophers of language should follow 
suit.  
 On the other hand, Devitt agrees that the possibility that lay people’s and philoso-
phers’ idiolects differ justifies examining lay people’s intuitions (2012, fn. 28), but this 
concession is in tension with his plea for the Expertise Defense. Many linguists have 
concluded from this possibility that the evidential basis of syntactic and semantic the-
ories consists of lay people’s linguistic intuitions, and that linguists’ intuitions carry less 
weight than lay people’s. By contrast, proponents of the Expertise Defense hold that 
lay people’s intuitions carry less weight than the intuitions of philosophers of lan-
guage. Devitt should clarify how evidence about experts’ intuitions and about lay peo-
ple’s should be combined, particularly when these disagree.  
4. Usage and Metalinguistic Intuitions 
Contrary to what Devitt suggests (2012, 31), I agree that studies of the use of words 
(in contrast to metalinguistic intuitions) provide relevant evidence to assess theories of 
reference. However, I disagree with the idea (which Devitt seems to endorse) that they 
provide better evidence than metalinguistic intuitions.  
 Linguists do not rely on metalinguistic intuitions because they endorse the Voice 
of Competence, but because these have two properties: They typically provide evi-
dence about the relevant syntactic and semantic properties that is as reliable, if not 
more, than occurrences in corpus and production studies, and one is more likely to 
obtain relevant evidence when one elicits metalinguistic intuitions than when one 
searches through existing corpora. Consider the first point. Intuitions about synonymy 
and antonymy provide reliable (but fallible) evidence about synonymy and antonymy; 
acceptability intuitions provide reliable (but fallible) evidence about the grammaticality 
of syntactic constructions; etc. Furthermore, metalinguistic intuitions do not suffer 
from the well-known problems that plague corpus and production studies such as the 
occurrence of ungrammatical constructions or the reluctance to use some construc-
tions for pragmatic reasons. Turning to the second point, whether corpus studies pro-
vide evidence bearing on theoretical controversies is a sheer matter of luck while stud-
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ies of metalinguistic intuitions can be easily engineered so as to provide relevant evi-
dence.  
 These considerations carry over straightforwardly to the study of intuitions about 
reference. In particular, the only study that compared intuitions about the reference of 
proper names and the use of sentences containing proper names found no difference 
between these two types of evidence (Machery et al. 2009). More precisely, Machery et 
al. failed to find any difference between people’s judgments about the truth of sen-
tences containing proper names and their judgments about the reference of proper 
names. The former kind of judgments was used as a proxy for the use of these sen-
tences since, except for a few kinds of sentences (e.g., sentences containing indexi-
cals), asserting that a sentence is true means being willing to assert this sentence. 
 So, yes, philosophers of language should study empirically how lay people use 
proper names, but, considering the reliability of metalinguistic intuitions and the prac-
tical advantages of studying them, they should not shun people’s intuitions about ref-
erence.  
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